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The current global agreement governing food aid—the Food Aid Convention (FAC)—will expire 
in 2007.  It has come under heavy criticism as has the diffuse set of broader food aid governance 
institutions that has emerged in the last 50 years.  These institutions are characterized by overlapping 
mandates, differing degrees of authority and legitimacy, varied levels of transparency in decisionmaking, 
and problematic representation of the major stakeholders.  A number of issues are likely to arise during 
the course of negotiations over a new FAC.  These include its objectives; the nature of commitments—
whether to express them in tonnage, value, or nutritional terms; the level of commitments and their 
distribution among donor countries; monitoring and enforcement of commitments; representation on the 
FAC governing body among food aid donor- and recipient-country governments and civil society 
organizations; and the institutional “home” of the FAC. 
More specifically, there is debate over such questions as whether the new FAC should have an 
“instrument focus”—food aid—or a “problem focus” such as “food security” or “hunger.”  If the focus is 
on addressing hunger, should food aid under the FAC be restricted to emergencies only or should it 
pertain to broader food security issues?  Should the FAC be a low-key forum for exchange of information 
or should it have some meaningful ways of monitoring commitments and encouraging compliance by 
both donors and recipients?  Debates such as these will reflect views on the purposes of food aid itself.  
Conversely, debates regarding these broader questions carry consequences for the formation of views on 
the issues involved in the FAC negotiations. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a strong likelihood that negotiations will soon begin on a new Food Aid Convention 
(FAC).  The current convention, which dates from 1999 and expires in July 2007, has come under heavy 
criticism as has the diffuse set of broader food aid governance institutions that has emerged in the last 50 
years.  These institutions are characterized by overlapping mandates, differing degrees of authority and 
legitimacy, varied levels of transparency in decisionmaking, and problematic representation of the major 
stakeholders; features that have led one recent analysis to describe them as “dysfunctional and outdated” 
and therefore “ineffective” (Barrett and Maxwell 2006). 
This paper identifies key issues facing the international governance of food aid with particular 
reference to renegotiation of the FAC.  Understanding these issues requires familiarity with a 
considerable body of background information and so, the first sections of the paper provide this.  It begins 
with a brief review of the FAC, its origins, current objectives, and a description of the principal 
controversies that surround it.  We then describe other important components of the current international 
architecture of food aid governance:  the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the World Food Programme (WFP), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), nongovernmental organization (NGO) codes of 
conduct, and the recently agreed upon Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Adequate Food.  The final 
background component is a brief review of the current world food situation and its implications for food 
aid needs.  Having reviewed these background issues, the paper outlines key issues that may arise in the 
FAC renegotiation.  These include the objectives of a new FAC; the nature of commitments—tonnage, 
value, nutritional aspects; the level of commitments and their distribution; monitoring and enforcement of 
commitments; representation on the Food Aid Committee; and housing of the Food Aid Convention.  The 
purpose of the paper is solely to outline issues and options; hence it does not advocate for particular 
positions. 
2.  The Food Aid Convention 
History and Current Status 
The FAC is one component of the International Grains Agreement, the other being the Grains 
Trade Convention.  The International Grains Council (IGC—formerly the International Wheat Council), 
located in London, has served as the Convention’s host agency and secretariat since its inception in 1967.  2 
The IGC is an intergovernmental organization outside the United Nations system.  Its principal function is 
to provide a forum for the exchange of information on world grain trade developments.  It monitors global 
grain markets and ocean freight rates, as well as providing summary reports on production, consumption, 
stocks, and prices on a monthly and annual basis.  In addition, it compiles reports of food aid shipments 
provided to it by its members (IGC 2005).  These data are made available to signatories to these 
Conventions; they are not publicly available. 
In the years prior to the first FAC, the United States was responsible for supplying most 
international food aid.  In the mid-1960s, the conjunction of changes in domestic U.S. farm policy 
together with weather- and war-induced crop failures in developing countries led to a tightening of global 
food stocks.  The United States was also concerned about growing European grain surpluses generated by 
the European Community’s Common Agricultural Program while the Europeans, for their part, wanted to 
secure their new-found role as a significant grain exporter via a new international wheat agreement.  In 
the context of the Kennedy Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
these circumstances led to the emergence of the FAC alongside a new Wheat Trade Convention as part of 
the International Grains Agreement.  The United States extracted pledges to “share the burden” of the 
provision of food aid to poor countries as a quid pro quo for a commercial trade agreement (Barrett and 
Maxwell 2005). 
Under Article I, the objective of the first FAC was “to carry out a food aid program with the help 
of contributions for the benefit of developing countries” (Australian Department of External Affairs 
1968).  It set a minimum tonnage level for international food aid of 4.06 million metric tons of grain, with 
signatories each agreeing to provide a fixed portion.  Article III of the Convention established a Food Aid 
Committee that would receive regular reports from contributing countries on the amount, content, 
channeling, and terms of their food aid contributions under the Convention; review the purchase of grains 
financed by cash contributions; examine the way in which the obligations undertaken under the food aid 
program have been fulfilled; and exchange information on a regular basis on the functioning of the food 
aid arrangements under the Convention, in particular, where information was available, on its effects on 
food production in recipient countries.  Decisionmaking in the Food Aid Committee was (and is) by 
consensus.  Signatories were the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Economic 
Community and its Member States.  Article VI of the 1967 FAC stated that countries could only be 
signatories if they were also signatories to the Wheat Trade Convention. 
The FAC has been subsequently renewed in 1971, 1980, 1986, 1995, and most recently in 1999.  
The 1999 FAC was originally set to expire in 2002, but members agreed to extend it through July 2007 in 
light of ongoing global trade negotiations.  Some crucial components of the Convention have remained 3 
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largely unchanged over time while other components have been significantly altered.  The 1999 FAC has 
23 signatories:  Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States, as well 
as the European Union (EU) and its member states (IGC 2005). 
One feature that has not changed has been the inclusion of a commitment to provide a minimum 
quantity of food aid.  The size of this commitment, however, has varied over time (Benson 2000; IGC 
1999); see Figure 1.  Other features that have persisted include using the IGC as the host agency and a 
membership limited to countries that commit to making food aid contributions. 
Figure 1:  FAC commitments and food aid flows, 1970-2005 
Note:  Data for 2005 are provisional. 
 
One important change that has occurred is that humanitarian and development assistance policy 
concerns are now taken into consideration to a much greater degree than in the past.  The objectives of the 
1999 Convention (IGC 1999), as outlined in Article I, are to 
. . . contribute to world food security and to improve the ability of the international 
community to respond to emergency food situations and other food needs of developing 
countries by: (a) making appropriate levels of food aid available on a predictable basis, as 
determined by the provisions of this Convention; (b) encouraging members to ensure that 
the food aid provided is aimed particularly at the alleviation of poverty and hunger of the 
most vulnerable groups, and is consistent with agricultural development in those 
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countries; (c)  including principles for maximizing the impact, the effectiveness and 
quality of the food aid provided as a tool in support of food security; and (d) providing a 
framework for cooperation, coordination and information-sharing among members on 
food aid related matters to achieve greater efficiency in all aspects of food aid operations 
and better coherence between food aid and other policy instruments. 
Second, from an initial focus on grains, the current Convention now includes pulses, root crops, 
edible oil, sugar, and skimmed milk powder among the eligible commodities that can count towards 
fulfilling pledges.  Although donor surplus disposal remains a factor (for example, the dairy products), 
this change is partly a result of the increased donor preference for local purchases and triangular 
transactions, as it includes more foods regularly consumed by poor people in developing countries.  The 
current EU FAC pledge includes €130 million in cash as well as a tonnage level, and several donors have 
agreed to cover the cost of transporting and delivering food, particularly in the case of emergencies and 
food aid provided to Least-Developed Countries.  The Convention encourages members to provide food 
aid in grant form, rather than as concessional sales, and to decouple food aid from export promotion.  The 
eligible commodities also include seeds, in recognition of the growing emergency character of food aid.  
There is, as well, a greater focus on nutrition with micronutrient fortified commodities also being eligible 
(IGC 2005). 
Criticisms of the Food Aid Convention 
The main focus of criticism has surrounded the commitments to minimum tonnage.  In principle, 
these should represent a meaningful floor below which shipments should not fall.  However, following 
the 1974 World Food Conference, governments pledged to provide either food or funds to assure an 
annual minimum of 10 million metric tons of food aid.  This tonnage level, nevertheless, has not been 
reflected in subsequent FAC commitments.  On average, the international community has met or 
exceeded the World Food Conference pledge, typically providing 10-13 million metric tons annually, 
though deliveries in 2004 of 7.5 million metric tons were the fifth lowest on record in the past 35 years 
(see Figure 1) (WFP/INTERFAIS 2006; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1998; Hoddinott, Cohen, 
and Bos 2003).  In any event, the FAC minimum commitment is set at such a low level that it is less than 
clear how meaningful it actually is. 
Because commitments are based on volume rather than monetary value, the FAC should, in 
principle, contribute modestly to making food aid countercyclical with respect to world grain supplies 
because donors pledge to make the minimum tonnage available regardless of price (IGC 2005; Benson 
2000; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1998).  In practice, this does not occur either.  The FAC is not 
the main driver of tonnage levels.  Rather, food aid provision is highly correlated with global grain prices 
and the size of U.S. harvests; the latter arising from the continued dominance of the United States as a 5 
donor, and its continued practice of providing food aid in kind.  Overall, food aid remains pro-cyclical 
(Barrett and Maxwell 2005).  All donors budget for food aid in monetary terms, rather than tonnage, so 
volumes rise and fall in inverse proportion to global prices, even though food aid needs are likely to rise 
when prices do.  For example, food aid levels fell dramatically in the mid-1990s, despite coinciding with 
a major food crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa.  Put another way, the FAC’s focus on tonnage 
commitments does not guarantee that food aid will provide an effective tool for tackling poverty and 
hunger, based on identified needs for food aid.  In this sense, it is not a particularly effective “safety net” 
(Benson 2000). 
An additional problem arises because tonnage pledges under the various iterations of the FAC are 
in “wheat equivalents.”  The FAC includes conversion factors for other commodities, based on average 
market price ratios and other factors (IGC 1999).  For example, a ton of rice counted as three tons of 
wheat under the 1980 FAC and 2.4 tons under the 1986 version.  This has allowed donors to provide 
substantially less tonnage than the nominal level pledged and still claim to have kept their commitments 
(Clay and Stokke 1991).  It has also further undercut the value of the FAC as a guarantee of a fixed 
quantity of food to address emergency needs and chronic hunger.  
In any event, there are no meaningful consequences when signatories fail to meet their 
commitments.  In 1994, U.S. food aid fell 170,000 metric tons short of the country’s 4.48 million ton 
pledge (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1998).  In recent years, Canada has repeatedly failed to meet 
its target tonnage (Barrett and Maxwell 2006).  The only penalty for failing to deliver is some minor 
damage to the member state’s reputation as a reliable supplier—minor because the Food Aid Committee 
does not make public any member’s failure to meet its commitments, and these only become apparent 
because the patchwork quilt of food aid governance has multiple report requirements (see below). 
Critics point to several other limitations of the FAC and the larger global food aid regime of 
which it is a part.  First, they note that there is no effort—and indeed no mechanism—to provide any 
meaningful dialogue on the effectiveness of food aid provided by signatories.  There is no systematic 
evaluation of individual donors or overall performance in relation to commitments, nor has the Food Aid 
Committee ever undertaken a systematic assessment of the impact of the Convention itself (Benson 2000; 
Barrett and Maxwell 2005).  
Second, representation on the Food Aid Committee is limited to FAC signatories.  Despite their 
prominence as food aid stakeholders, recipient-country governments and NGOs are excluded from 
negotiations over FAC terms and discussions of food aid policy and practice held under the auspices of 
the Food Aid Committee.  Representatives from the World Food Programme (WFP), FAO, WTO, OECD, 
and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development are supposedly able to attend as observers (IGC 
2005), and, in fact, the Committee sometimes asks them to speak to certain issues.  In practice, however, 6 
the representatives from these agencies often cannot attend the sessions when Committee members have 
not requested their presence.
1 
Third, the FAC operates without much transparency.  The Food Aid Committee provides 
remarkably little public information on its deliberations, even though the members are represented by 
officials of democratic governments that are accountable to their citizens.  Background position papers 
provided by signatories are difficult to obtain and no minutes of the meetings are made publicly available.  
Information on deliberations, such as the press release that follows meetings, excludes mention of points 
of disagreement among members that occurred in that meeting and—unlike the materials circulated 
among members—does not include details of individual members’ adherence to the articles of the 
Convention. 
The FAC and the Food Aid Committee are part of a wider set of institutions and actors involved 
in food aid governance.  A fourth criticism, related to the question of transparency, focuses on this wider 
food aid regime.  Authority is diffuse and mandates overlap, with the result that accountability is often 
unclear. 
3.  Other Elements of the Current International Architecture of 
Food Aid Governance 
In this section, we briefly describe other institutions that play important roles in the governance, 
monitoring, and delivery of food aid.  These are FAO’s Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal 
(CSSD), WTO, WFP, OECD’s DAC, relevant NGO codes of conduct, and the recently agreed upon 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Adequate Food. 
The Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal 
The CSSD was established in 1954, at a time when food aid accounted for a major share of the 
global grain trade.  Its purpose is to monitor adherence to FAO’s “Principles of Surplus Disposal,” which 
comprise “a code of international conduct which encourages the constructive use of surplus agricultural 
commodities and at the same time safeguards the interests of commercial exporters and local producers” 
(Konandreas 2005, 10).  In practice, it focuses on program food aid (now almost entirely from the United 
States), i.e., commodities provided via untargeted, government-to-government transfers.  In contrast, 
project and emergency food aid—usually targeted to vulnerable groups, linked to humanitarian or 
development activities, and carried out by NGOs or WFP—are generally regarded as additional to 
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commercial exports.  Unlike the Food Aid Committee, the CSSD includes both developed- and 
developing-country governments among its members with a number of international organizations and 
NGOs (including the International Federation of Agricultural Producers and the International Monetary 
Fund) holding observer status (Barrett and Maxwell 2005).  It operates under the umbrella of FAO’s 
Committee on Commodity Problems, and is able to draw on FAO’s considerable staff expertise on 
agricultural trade, food aid, and food security.  However, the Principles of Surplus Disposal are 
nonbinding commitments and, like the Food Aid Committee, the CSSD has no enforcement powers.  
Notification of transactions is voluntary.  While the share of global food aid reported through the CSSD 
was around 80 percent in the early 1990s, these notifications fell dramatically throughout the 1990s, 
reaching a low of less than 5 percent in 2000-01 (Barrett and Maxwell 2005, 70), although these have 
recovered subsequently. 
The World Trade Organization
2 
As noted earlier, the initial FAC was a by-product of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations.  
Food aid re-entered global trade talks as part of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
and is playing a prominent role in current Doha Round talks. 
Unlike the Food Aid Committee and the CSSD, the WTO has the means to enforce its rules.  The 
organization has a highly structured system for resolving member disputes.  Members that refuse to abide 
by the decisions of the WTO disputes settlement process regarding alleged unfair trading practices face 
WTO-endorsed trade sanctions such as countervailing duties imposed by the complaining members 
(WTO 2006b).  Like the CSSD, the WTO on paper has a North-South governance structure.  Effective 
Northern dominance, particularly on agricultural issues, has diminished considerably with the emergence 
of the Group of 20, an influential bloc of developing-country exporters.  However, WTO rules and 
procedures remain arcane, making it difficult for poorer developing countries to participate on anything 
approaching an equal footing (Halle 2005; Hopkins 1993). 
An important issue, which arose first in the Uruguay Round and is especially prominent in current 
talks, is the possibility that some countries might use food aid to circumvent restrictions on export 
subsidies.  As a result, the AoA included an explicit discussion of “bona fide” food aid: 
Members donors of international food aid shall ensure: a) that the provision of 
international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of 
agricultural products to recipient countries; b) that international food aid transactions, 
including bilateral food aid which is monetized, shall be carried out in accordance with 
the FAO “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations” including, where 
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appropriate, the system of Usual Marketing Requirements (UMRs); and c) that such aid 
shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less 
concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986 
(WTO 1994a: Article 10.4). 
In addition, some countries expressed concern during the Uruguay Round that the liberalization in 
agricultural trade envisaged under the AoA might lead to sharply higher food prices.  For this reason, the 
WTO adopted the 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Decision, addressing possible negative effects of 
agricultural trade liberalization on the Least Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries 
(WTO 1994b).  The Decision recommends increased food aid as one means to help those countries, along 
with compensatory financial aid and assistance to agricultural development.  Nevertheless, the Decision 
does not specify that food aid provided under its terms should be targeted to vulnerable groups or support 
development activities.  Rather, it conceives of food aid more as a kind of short-term balance of payments 
support or means of adjusting to price spikes (although the specification of aid to agricultural 
development as an alternative or complementary compensatory measure potentially mitigates this).  
Indeed, it could be read as calling for program food aid, which is widely viewed as trade-distorting.  
Significantly, though, the Decision has never been implemented, since it specifies no monitoring or 
enforcement body, and does not spell out the specific circumstances that would trigger its implementation 
(Konandreas 2005; Hoddinott, Cohen, and Bos 2003). 
Subsequently, food aid has emerged as a contentious issue in the Doha Round.  The European 
Union, under pressure to eliminate its export subsidies, has in turn criticized U.S. in-kind food aid for 
displacing commercial sales and distorting trade.  Discussions initially focused particularly on program 
food aid, which accounted for half of all food aid in the 1990s, but 15-25 percent in the current decade 
(WFP/INTERFAIS 2006).  The United States has agreed in principle that program food aid should come 
under WTO’s purview, but has resisted calls to subject non-program in-kind food aid to WTO disciplines.  
Leaders of the U.S. Congress adamantly support in-kind food aid, and vow not to permit changes in the 
basic legislation governing U.S. food aid (U.S. House of Representatives 2005).  In addressing food aid 
issues in the WTO negotiations, WFP Executive Director James Morris has emphasized that local and 
regional purchases can also disrupt markets, bidding up prices when supplies are tight (Morris 2005).  
At the conclusion of discussions held in Hong Kong in December 2005, the WTO Ministerial 
Declaration indicated: 
On food aid, we confirm our commitment to maintain an adequate level and to take into 
account the interests of food aid recipient countries. To this end, a “safe box” for bona 
fide food aid will be provided to ensure that there is no unintended impediment to dealing 
with emergency situations. Beyond that, we will ensure elimination of commercial 
displacement. To this end, we will agree effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, 9 
monetization and re-exports so that there can be no loop-hole for continuing export 
subsidization. The disciplines . . . will be completed by 30 April 2006 as part of the 
modalities, including appropriate provision in favour of least-developed and net food-
importing developing countries as provided for in paragraph 4 of the Marrakesh Decision 
(WTO 2005). 
Subsequently, the Chair of the WTO Committee on Agriculture prepared a reference paper on 
food aid designed to assist discussions (WTO 2006a).  The paper suggested that, in the context of any 
new WTO agreement, it would be highly desirable—at least from the point-of-view of further 
negotiations—to separate emergency and nonemergency food aid.  Emergency food aid would be placed 
in a “Safe Box” designed to ensure that WTO disciplines do not unintentionally impede responses to 
needs brought about by emergencies.  The critical questions then become what constitutes the 
commencement and duration of an emergency, and who decides?  The reference paper strongly suggested 
that WTO itself not be the body that makes such decisions, instead deferring to some other body or 
bodies.  The Chair noted, “I have not detected any fundamental disagreement with the view that 
nonemergency in-kind food aid should be needs based, should not be tied, should be targeted and 
provided for specific objectives” (WTO 2006a, 7).  However, divergences remain over the continued 
provision of in-kind food aid and monetization.  As Clay (2006) points out, a number of crucial issues 
would appear to remain unresolved.  These include (1) How does one distinguish between “bona fide” 
food aid used to deal with emergencies and disguised export subsidies; (2) How can the intentions behind 
the Marrakesh Decision be maintained and operationalized; and (3) How can (1) and (2) be monitored and 
enforced?  
As of this writing, WTO members have “suspended” the Doha Round talks.  Disagreements 
between the United States and the European Union over subsidies, domestic farm support, and food aid 
were among the major sticking points, along with developing countries’ worries that trade liberalization 
will undermine their small-farm sectors (WTO 2006c). 
The World Food Programme 
WFP is the U.N. system’s operational food aid agency, and it presently delivers about half of all 
food aid and a major share of emergency food aid in any given year (Clay, Riley, and Urey 2004).  It is 
the intergovernmental institution with the most expertise on making food aid support sustainable 
development, poverty reduction, and food security, and on linking relief and development.  WFP 
maintains a comprehensive database on all global food aid, not just its own operations, the International 
Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS), and the agency’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping 
(VAM) system helps it to design food aid operations on the basis of need.  Together with FAO, WFP 
plays a major role in carrying out needs assessments that are the basis of consolidated and flash appeals 10 
issued by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to assist those affected 
by natural and human-induced disasters.  
WFP also has relatively transparent governance, with power shared between Northern and 
Southern governments on the Executive Board.  The Presidency of the Board regularly rotates between 
representatives of the North and the South, with the Vice Presidency held by a Northerner when the 
President is from the South, and vice versa.  The agency has enhanced its policy analysis capacity 
considerably in recent years, but its main focus remains on operations, not policy (Hoddinott, Cohen, and 
Bos 2003).  WFP also has extensive relationships with both civil society and the private sector, and its 
policy is to carry out food aid operations with a high degree of beneficiary participation. 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD 
As food aid is considered Official Development Assistance (ODA), it comes under the DAC’s 
statistical reporting and policy harmonization mandates.  Food aid flows are reported to the DAC, making 
it the fourth body, after the Food Aid Committee, the CSSD, and INTERFAIS, to which such flows are 
reported.  The DAC carries out extensive studies on aid best practice and effectiveness, and these have 
included a number that have proved influential in food aid debates such as Clay, Riley, and Urey (2004).  
In contrast to the FAC Food Aid Committee, the DAC regularly facilitates “peer review” of member 
governments’ aid programs.
3  However, the DAC can only recommend, but not enforce, suggestions 
aimed at improving the effectiveness of food aid and other ODA.   
NGO Codes of Conduct 
NGOs on both sides of the Atlantic have undertaken a number of voluntary initiatives to improve 
the effectiveness of food aid as a humanitarian and development tool.  EuronAid, the European food aid 
NGO association, developed a code of conduct on food aid in 1995 that helped influence the European 
Union to decouple food assistance from domestic surpluses and link it more strongly to programs to 
promote food security.  EuronAid also promoted more effective linkages between relief and development 
programs.
4  Between 1989 and 2004, U.S. food aid NGOs worked through the Food Aid Management 
(FAM) consortium to develop common standards to “promote the efficient and effective use of food aid 
resources to help alleviate hunger and contribute to food security.”
5  
                                                 
3 See the DAC’s peer review homepage, http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34603_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
4 Gerhard Schmalbruch, EuronAid Secretary General, personal communication, 10 April 2006.  See www.euronaid.net for the 
text of the code of conduct. 
5 Food for the Hungry International continues to maintain the archived FAM website, http://www.foodaid.org/default.htm, and 
FAM’s extensive library of food aid and food security resources is maintained by Counterpart International. 11 
The Sphere project is an effort by humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross-Red Crescent 
movement to develop a set of standards for humanitarian assistance, including food aid.  Although the 
standards are likewise purely voluntary, they have had considerable influence in recent years. The project 
proceeds from two principles:  that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising 
out of calamity and conflict; and that those affected have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right 
to assistance.
6 
In 2006, a group of Canadian, European, and U.S. NGOs created an informal network, the Trans-
Atlantic NGO Food Aid Policy Dialogue, aimed at developing principles for a new FAC.  The groups 
agreed that the Convention “should focus on ensuring the availability of direct food transfers for food 
insecure people and their associated delivery and distribution costs,” based on comprehensive and 
ongoing needs assessment, greater transparency and accountability, and consultation of a broader range of 
stakeholders than just donor governments (Canadian Foodgrains Bank 2006). 
The Right to Food Voluntary Guidelines 
The Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food 
in the Context of National Food Security also applies a rights lens to food aid.
7  The Guidelines were 
approved by the FAO Council in November 2004.  They call upon states that provide food aid to conform 
with the FAC and other relevant international agreements, and assure that their food aid policies support 
the efforts of recipient states to “progressively realize the right to adequate food . . . .”  In addition, the 
Guidelines encourage donors to carry out “sound needs assessment” that engages both recipient and 
donors, in order to assure that aid goes to “needy and vulnerable groups.”  The Guidelines call on donors 
to provide food aid taking into account food safety, local and regional food production capacity and 
benefits, and nutritional needs and cultures of the recipients.  Finally, in emergency situations, the 
guidelines encourage affected states to provide food assistance to those in need, and to seek international 
assistance as necessary.  This suggests that the international community has a moral duty—if not a legally 
binding obligation—to assist in such circumstances.  As their name implies, the Guidelines are strictly 
voluntary, although their endorsement by the FAO’s member states does give them a substantial degree of 
legitimacy as guiding principles.  Some NGOs (for example, FTNC 2005) have called for the FAC to 
make explicit mention of the Voluntary Guidelines and the right to adequate food. 
                                                 
6 Detailed information on the project is posted at http://www.sphereproject.org. 
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4.  The Current Food Security Outlook and Its Implications for Food Aid 
There are a number of disquieting dimensions to global food security.  Taken together, these 
create a substantial ongoing need for food aid to address both chronic and acute (emergency) 
requirements.  According to FAO, more than 800 million people in developing countries have inadequate 
access to food, and if China is excluded from consideration, the number of food-insecure people increased 
between 1990 and 2000 (FAO 2004).
8  Humanitarian emergency needs remain substantial, although 
actual needs in any given year fluctuate with the number and intensity of conflicts and natural disasters. 
The international community’s response to emergencies is highly variable.  Sometimes, there is 
an impressive response that saves lives and minimizes human suffering.  For example, the U.N. system 
appealed for $1.3 billion to assist 5 million people in 12 countries affected by the December 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami.  By the following June, official aid agencies had covered 81 percent of the appeal, and 
there was a massive outpouring of private charitable donations.  
Unfortunately, prompt and effective emergency aid is increasingly the exception to the rule.  In 
recent years, overall contributions have consistently lagged behind appeals.  In November 2004, OCHA 
issued a Consolidated Appeal to meet the emergency needs of 26 million people in 14 developing and 
transition countries, territories, and subregions over the coming year.  By June of 2005, donors had 
covered 48 percent of the Consolidated Appeal and subsequent flash appeals.  However, if tsunami relief 
is excluded from consideration, the figure falls to just 36 percent.
9  Urgent U.N. appeals for humanitarian 
aid to assist people affected by violence in the Darfur region of Sudan generated a far more modest 
response than the tsunami relief appeal.  By mid-2005, donors had provided only 33 percent of the $2 
billion requested to help 2.5 million people in Sudan, and an appeal for Chad for aid to refugees from 
Darfur and elsewhere garnered a 27 percent response.  The slow donor response to the 2004-05 crisis in 
Niger received considerable media attention, becoming emblematic of the limitations of the current 
humanitarian appeals process. 
The anemic reaction to the Niger emergency is unfortunately typical in another way.  Over the 
past 15 years, the long-term trend in emergency food aid is that conflict-related emergencies usually 
induce twice as much food aid as natural disasters (Hoddinott, Cohen, and Bos 2003).
10 
                                                 
8 This is only one dimension of food and nutrition security with other indicators showing additional cause for concern.  For 
example, micronutrient malnutrition is far more widespread, with some 3.5 billion people in developing countries consuming 
iron-deficient diets (SCN 2004). 
9 OCHA’s 2005 Consolidated Appeal and the Mid-year Update are both posted at 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/index.html>. 
10 Specifically, we found that in low-income countries, a 10 percent increase in the number of persons affected by conflict 
increases food aid shipments by 2.4 percent; a 10 percent increase in the number of persons affected by natural disaster increases 
food aid shipments by 1.1 percent. 13 
There are also some important trends in global food production that are worth noting.  Global 
cereals production in 2005 was estimated to be approximately 2.2 billion metric tons, an increase of 
approximately 15 percent since 1990.  Virtually all this increase has occurred in developing countries, 
with Brazil making a noteworthy contribution to the latter in the last five years (von Braun 2005).  Global 
food stocks fell significantly between 1997 and 2003, from approximately 580 to 300 million metric tons, 
though they have recovered slightly since then (von Braun et al. 2005).  Further, there have been 
significant increases in wheat and rice prices since 2000 (von Braun 2005), although to some extent, these 
represent recovery from the unusually low prices of the late 1990s.
11  IFPRI’s International Model for 
Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) projects that future increases in 
production will hinge crucially on additional investments in the agricultural sector, including efforts 
aimed at increasing productivity and improving the management of natural resources (von Braun et al. 
2005).  
Four other developments are worth noting.  First, increased amounts of North American grain are 
likely to go into producing alternative fuels, absorbing grain that might otherwise provide food aid 
resources.  Second, there have been past controversies about food aid from genetically modified (GM) 
cereals and it is likely that such controversies will occur in the future.  GM grains comprise a growing 
share of agricultural production both in North America and also in major grain- and oilseed-exporting 
developing countries such as Argentina and Brazil.  Third, although some scientists disagree, many 
believe that over the next few decades, climatic change is likely to contribute to reduced agricultural 
production in developing countries and to more severe and frequent extreme weather events, such as 
droughts and floods (Wilson 2001).  Fourth, the availability of in-kind food resources from donors may 
decline due to reduced domestic support for agriculture, depending on the outcomes of the Doha Round, 
regardless of whether new WTO agreements restrict nonemergency in-kind food aid.  It is anticipated that 
developing countries would realize real, if modest, gains in agricultural export revenues and value-added 
from reductions in Northern domestic farm support (Diao et al. 2005), but it is not clear to what extent 
these gains will benefit poor and food-insecure people. 
As Barrett and Maxwell (2006) and others (Clay, Riley, and Urey 2004; Hoddinott, Cohen, and 
Bos 2003; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1998) have noted, the FAC emerged in an era when food 
aid accounted for a much greater share of both the international grain trade (15-20 percent) and ODA (20 
percent) than today, when it comprises less than 7 percent of FAC members’ cereal exports and under 4 
percent of ODA (see Table 1).  In the 1960s, program food aid from donor domestic harvests, provided in 
the case of the United States via concessional sales on easy credit terms, represented a substantial share of 
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food aid.  Such approaches were significantly flawed:  they increased recipient country debt, the 
commodities were usually monetized in a highly inefficient transfer of resources into recipient 
government treasuries, and this is the form of food aid most likely to disrupt recipient-country markets 
(Barrett and Maxwell 2005). 
Table 1: Food aid tonnage as a percent of FAC member cereal exports, by value, and 
as a percent of official development assistance, 1995-2004 
Year 
Total food aid tonnage as a 
percent of FAC Member 
cereal exports, 1997 
Value of food aid 
shipments  
(US$ billion) 
Food aid as a 
percent of 
total ODA 
1995 5.9  1.4  2.2 
1996 4.3  1.3  2.6 
1997 4.3  1.2  2.7 
1998 5.1  1.3  2.8 
1999 8.3  2.4  4.3 
2000 6.2  2.0  3.9 
2001 6.5  1.8  3.5 
2002 6.1  2.8  4.7 
2003 7.0  2.5  3.0 
2004 4.8  3.1  3.5 
Average, 1995-2004  5.9  2.0  3.3 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from INTERFAIS, FAOSTAT and DAC databases. 
 
Much has changed in the last 40 years.  In per capita terms, food aid to all developing countries 
has fallen by two-thirds since 1970 (Hoddinott, Cohen, and Bos 2003).  Most food aid is now in the form 
of grants.  Emergency food aid, frequently provided through multilateral channels and/or NGOs, is 
increasingly targeted on the basis of need and accounts for between half and two-thirds of all tonnage, 
depending on the level of emergency appeals in any given year.  Nonemergency food aid is now used 
mainly to support a more narrow range of activities such as food-for-work aimed at building 
infrastructure or developing assets, school feeding, or health and nutrition interventions, and such projects 
have accounted for 25 percent of the tonnage over the last five years (WFP/INTERFAIS 2006).  Many 
donors are reducing food aid from their own farms and are instead providing cash to purchase food in 
either the recipient country or neighboring countries (practices known as local purchases and triangular 
transactions).  The European Union, several of its member states, and, beginning this year, Canada, 
provide a substantial share of their food aid in the form of cash rather than commodities.  However, in 
2003, 90 percent of food aid was still tied in various ways to donor-country goods and services (Clay, 
Riley, and Urey 2004), and the United States, which remains the largest bilateral donor and the largest 
donor to WFP, continues to provide virtually all of its food aid in kind (WFP/INTERFAIS 2006; Clay, 
Riley, and Urey 2004).  In 2005, the U.S. Congress rejected the U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s proposal to allow up to 25 percent of the food aid budget to be used for local purchases 
and triangular transactions (Dugger 2005; Mekay 2005). 15 
Pulling all these points together suggests the following trends:  (1) there has been progress in 
understanding when it is appropriate, and when it is inappropriate, to use food aid as a resource.
12  
However, this process is not complete;
13 (2) many, though not all, donors are moving toward a more 
flexible approach to food aid, where cash may be provided instead of in-kind resources; (3) while not 
meaning to sound alarmist, complacency regarding trends in global food production would be ill-advised 
as would complacency regarding global availability of food aid or cash aid to purchase food, as well as 
resources to support agricultural and rural development.  
5.  Key Issues and Options in FAC Renegotiation 
Below we consider a range of issues and options in FAC renegotiation.  These include whether or 
not to renegotiate the Convention; what its objectives should be; whether to retain a minimum 
commitment (the historic centerpiece of the FAC); monitoring, evaluation, and enforcement of 
commitments; and such institutional questions as who should sit on the Food Aid Committee and where 
the FAC should be housed. 
Should There Be Another FAC? 
There are two extreme options for renegotiation:  retention of the status quo and elimination of 
the FAC.  Neither seems tenable, for different reasons.  Arguing that the status quo should be retained 
would be defensible if one believed that (1) the FAC is functioning effectively and (2) that there are no 
changes in the external environment that impinge on the operation of the FAC.  The existing reviews 
summarized earlier have largely argued that there are serious weaknesses with the existing FAC.  Even if 
one disagreed with these assessments, changes in other fora—most notably the WTO negotiations—
would rule out long-term retention of the status quo. 
It could be argued that the FAC is so fundamentally flawed that reform, even if radical, is of little 
use.  In addition to the criticisms noted earlier, as part of British deliberations regarding the 1999 
Convention, the then Secretary for International Development, Clare Short, stated to the House of 
Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny that 
                                                 
12 Clay and Stokke (2000) argue that food aid is the most appropriate form of assistance “when there is a market collapse and also 
institutional weaknesses.”  They also believe that a number of social and technical factors must be present, along with high food 
insecurity:  a high incidence of chronic undernutrition, endemic micronutrient deficiency, lack of purchasing power on the part of 
vulnerable groups, incomplete or volatile markets (unlike in Bangladesh in 1998), and “availability of commodities which are 
especially appropriate to the needs of the food-insecure combined with delivery of targeting capacity” (p. 376). 
13 For example, there is a dearth of studies documenting the impacts of local food purchases on local markets in developing 
countries, and it is not always clear whether the voices of beneficiaries—particularly women—are listened to in “cash vs. food” 
debates. 16 
The U.K. has consistently been skeptical about the value of Food Aid Conventions.  U.K. 
policy has for some time been that food aid in-kind can be an appropriate response to 
emergency situations but that other forms of aid (financial and technical) are more 
efficient and effective in supporting development, and have fewer potential 
disadvantages.  We therefore see no merit in quantified targets for supplying food aid as 
opposed to any other form of aid.  In addition, such targets reduce the flexibility to use 
the UK development program in the best possible way in pursuit of commitments in the 
White Paper. 
However, Ms. Short went on to note that  
Many other governments take a different view.  Recipient countries regard the FAC as a 
guarantee of minimum commitment levels.  For most other FAC Members and E.U. 
partners, the FAC commitments protect specific food aid budgets within their aid 
programs, or relate to budget provisions outside their aid programs.  For them, the FAC 
commitments can represent some real addition to total aid levels (U.K. House of 
Commons 1999). 
To the best of our knowledge, no major signatory has signaled a desire to end the Convention.  
Many, however, have signaled a strong desire to see it reformed—although the nature and scope of these 
proposed reforms vary widely by signatory.  Further, the FAC was explicitly incorporated into the WTO’s 
AoA as a result of the Uruguay Round.  Should the Doha Round also incorporate the FAC into final 
agreements, then the option of abandoning the FAC altogether would be infeasible. 
Objectives of a New FAC 
The 1967 Food Aid Convention had, as its objective, an “instrument focus”—the conduct of a 
food aid program (see Section 2).  By 1999, considerable evolution had occurred; arguably, the objectives 
of the 1999 Convention can be seen as outlining how an instrument (food aid) can be applied toward a 
problem (world food security and emergencies).  A critical issue for any new FAC will be its objectives.  
What are some possibilities? 
•  A minimalist approach—tinkering with the existing objectives so that they remain consistent with 
any new agreements on food aid that emerge from the Doha Round. 
•  The use of language embodying greater meaningful commitment to the Convention.  For 
example, instead of “encouraging members” to use food aid appropriately, a new FAC could 
“monitor members.” 
•  An enhanced “instrument focus”—in terms of the role of the FAC in facilitating the 
dissemination of information on best practices in the use of food aid, increased transparency, 17 
disseminating information on adherence to commitments, and sponsoring the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the use of food aid, particularly in relationship to assessed need. 
•  A strengthened “problem focus”—for example, being more explicit in terms of the objectives of 
food aid for preventing famine, reducing hunger and malnutrition, and working toward improved 
food security. 
•  An “expanded problem focus”—covering a broader conception of “food assistance” and 
including a range of food and cash programs aimed at fostering food security; or 
•  A “restricted problem focus”—for example, focusing solely on the role of food aid in the context 
of emergencies. 
These options would have various impacts on the character of the FAC.  The first two are 
basically “status quo plus,” in that they do not depart substantially from the current parameters of the 
FAC.  The second might enhance compliance with commitments somewhat, especially if the Food Aid 
Committee made monitoring reports public and disseminated them widely.  The third option is a 
strengthened version of the second that would go farther in terms of encouraging compliance with 
commitments and address food aid quality questions as well as quantitative commitments.  The final three 
possibilities would transform the FAC substantially by shifting even more toward a focus on quality 
issues, and in the case of the last two options, by changing the subject matter focus of the Convention.  
Should the FAC Retain Minimum Commitments? 
Is there merit in having an international legal commitment to minimum food aid disbursements?  
There is a lively ongoing debate over whether donors should provide food, cash, or some combination of 
the two in the context of both ongoing development operations and in response to food-related 
emergencies.  Some donors are moving away from sourcing food aid from within their own jurisdictions 
but not all are doing so and some are moving faster than others.  For example, the European Union has 
recently (January 2006) indicated that “operations will be financed primarily with cash to stimulate local 
production and markets.  In the absence of functional markets and alternative options, implementing 
partners may use cash allocations to purchase and distribute food” (EU 2006, 17).  But some E.U. 
member states continue to provide bilateral in-kind food aid, notably France and Denmark (Barrett and 
Maxwell 2005).  Canada recently authorized the use of up to 50 percent of its food aid budget for local 
purchases and triangular transactions.  By contrast, the United States is, for the time being, continuing to 
provide virtually all of its food aid in-kind. 18 
However, in considering the issue of minimum commitments, it may not be helpful to subsume 
this entirely within debates over the merits of food or cash as aid.  There are several interlinked issues at 
play. 
For example, suppose one argued that food aid is an inefficient, distorting, outmoded means of 
providing assistance.  Where there are concerns over food access, for example in the context of 
emergencies, cash would be provided or, as a last resort, food could be purchased locally.  Taking this 
view to its logical conclusion would lead to an argument that a reformed FAC should not require 
minimum commitments.  A second argument would start from the premise that commitment without 
enforcement is likely to be meaningless.  Neither the United States nor Canada faced sanctions or much 
public criticism when they reneged on their FAC commitments in the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, 
respectively.  In other words, commitment in the absence of monitoring or enforcement is meaningless, so 
why bother with commitments? 
A different argument would start from the premise that although much past use of food aid was 
inappropriate, there still remains a place for food aid.  There have been, and are likely to remain, instances 
where local food markets are either nonexistent or limited.  There may also be places where such markets 
exist, but they are thin so that significant local purchases will cause substantial price rises, thereby 
potentially harming poor households that are net food purchasers.  Further, while cash may be easier and 
cheaper to distribute, and may provide greater flexibility to recipients, bestowing cash exposes 
households to potentially volatile food prices and, in some localities, physical risks in acquiring food 
where civil conflict is rife. 
Of course, this argument is most relevant in the context of emergencies and so these debates 
naturally link to whether future FAC commitments should apply to all food aid or only to that pertaining 
to assistance in emergency (and possibly protracted relief and recovery) operations.  A commitment to 
provide a certain quantity of food in emergency settings could be seen, for example, as part of a global 
insurance mechanism to prevent famine; in fact, this argument has been made within the FAC.  
However, if limited to emergencies, should the FAC morph into a Humanitarian Aid Convention, 
covering all humanitarian assistance, and not just food?  The latter option would change the character of 
the Convention dramatically, address the current deficiencies of the humanitarian response system, and 
move toward improving the balance between food and nonfood assistance in emergency response.  
A food aid commitment would not mean that donor signatories had to supply food from their own 
resources.  As is done under the current FAC, these commitments could be expressed in terms of physical 
tonnage, cash, or some combination.  One could also consider whether costs related to the provision of 
food aid, such as those associated with micronutrient fortification or shipping and inland transportation, 
should be included.  Likewise, a future FAC could cover the costs of creating and maintaining an 19 
enhanced system of emergency reserves, although past efforts to craft such a system have proved 
politically difficult.  
A key issue that then arises is whether a cash commitment is, by itself, sufficient or whether it 
should be expressed as a tonnage equivalent.  U.S. critics point out that E.U. food aid tonnage has 
declined with the shift away from in-kind food aid (U.S. House of Representatives 2005).  While this 
argument could be regarded as merely part of ongoing Trans-Atlantic tensions, it is worth remembering 
that with a few honorable exceptions, most donors have failed to deliver on 30 years of pledges to provide 
at least 0.7 percent of their gross national product as ODA and so there are legitimate questions regarding 
the credibility of cash commitments.  Further, global grain markets are characterized by occasional price 
spikes and should these coincide with sizeable emergency needs for food, a cash commitment would 
probably fall far short of requirements.  A similar consideration applies to shipping costs.  At times, these, 
too, have risen sharply, and there has been at least one occasion in recent years when no shipper was 
willing to carry emergency food aid.  If these considerations are perceived to have merit, then arguably 
there is a case for a “tonnage equivalent commitment” or perhaps a “c.i.f. [cargo, insurance, and freight] 
tonnage equivalent commitment.”  But it should be noted that expressing commitments in this way will 
require a whole series of tricky technical discussions.  For example, where (geographically) is the 
reference point for c.i.f. commitments?  How does one account for actions such as the provision of 
micronutrient fortification aimed at improving the nutritional quality of food aid?  Should donors 
continue to obtain credit for supplying commodities that cost more than wheat and how should these 
“wheat equivalents” be calculated when bearing in mind that such equivalents may significantly reduce 
the actual tonnage provided versus the nominal pledge?  
Monitoring, Evaluation, and Enforcement of Commitments 
The absence of meaningful consequences associated with failing to meet commitments has long 
been a criticism of the FAC.  Bearing in mind the difficulties of getting sovereign states to agree to 
subject themselves to sanctions, there is merit to considering how the monitoring, evaluation, and 
enforcement of commitments could be strengthened. 
Currently, the DAC monitors and evaluates bilateral aid via several mechanisms including peer 
review and the commissioning of specialist studies.
14  One possibility is that a new FAC would call on the 
DAC to take on such a role for food aid; another possibility could be that such a role is taken up by an 
expanded and more effective FAC secretariat.  The FAC could strengthen its relationship with the DAC, 
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the CSSD, and WFP so as to harmonize reporting of (ideally) all food aid flows regardless of the source 
of the food.  Harmonized, transparent reporting, coupled with regular peer review, would strengthen FAC 
members’ incentives for compliance with their pledges.  As Franck (1990, 193) notes, states generally 
comply voluntarily with international agreements and rules “as a concomitant of the status of 
membership” in a community of nations.  
Monitoring could address important questions of food aid quality as well.  Harmonization of 
reporting would assist in dealing with food aid flows that violate WTO rules; for example, in the absence 
of reforms and improvements to the CSSD reporting process, the WTO could draw on technical expertise 
within a strengthened FAC secretariat in considering food aid-related trade disputes. 
A further consideration, relevant here, is the criticism that commitments are divorced from needs 
assessment.  Here, too, a strengthened FAC could play an important role in monitoring how actual food 
aid flows relate to needs assessment.  For example, peer review could incorporate assessments of whether 
food aid by donors is really responsive to food needs.  The FAC could also reconsider, on a more regular 
basis, the list of countries that could be eligible for food aid.  These assessments could also incorporate 
the rights-based approach, using, for example, the Sphere principles and the Voluntary Guidelines.  An 
expanded FAC secretariat could provide the monitoring necessary to trigger implementation of the WTO 
Marrakesh Decision, which refers explicitly to the FAC as an implementation mechanism.  It also would 
monitor the impact of food aid (again, regardless of source) on food production and markets in recipient 
countries.  
Representation on the Food Aid Committee 
The Food Aid Committee, as currently constituted, only includes donors. An issue to consider is 
whether it, or a successor body, should include representation of a broader range of food aid stakeholders.  
Obviously, the donors who provide the resources—food and cash alike—will remain at the table, 
particularly since they are the ones making commitments under the FAC.  Inasmuch as the Committee or 
its successor will also discuss policy issues related to food aid, recipient-country government 
representation would mean both greater fairness and effectiveness.  The presence of recipient-country 
representatives can provide additional information on needs and whether cash or food offers the most 
appropriate intervention at a given time and under given circumstances.  International development policy 
fora likewise increasingly provide a place for relevant and competent international organizations, the 
private sector, and civil society groups to observe and speak, if not participate in decisionmaking.  WFP 
and operational NGOs are among the key stakeholders.  Sufficiently broad civil society representation can 
assure that the views of actual food aid beneficiaries come into play.  There is abundant evidence that 
engaging program beneficiaries in planning, implementation, and evaluation of development efforts leads 21 
to better results.  There is also the well-established principle that those who receive benefits from 
programs should have a say in those programs as a matter of rights. 
Whether it is feasible to expand representation on the Committee depends on resolving two 
crucial questions of institutional design.  First, the Food Aid Convention is part of a package—the other 
part being the Grains Trade Convention—which, as explained earlier, make up the International Grains 
Agreement.  Beneficiary representation would require either amendments to the Grains Trade Convention 
or a decoupling of the Food Aid Convention from the International Grains Agreement. 
Second, it is not clear that existing signatories would welcome new members who enter with 
rights but without responsibilities and so consideration of expanding membership should be accompanied 
by consideration of obligations that would be incumbent on all members.  For example, Barrett and 
Maxwell (2006) suggest that such obligations could include commitments to ensure the physical security 
of donated commodities; guarantee the physical safety of staff of operational agencies charged with 
distributing these; renounce the use of food as an instrument of war and of political persecution; maintain 
the free flow of information related to food needs as well as the monitoring and evaluation of these flows; 
and ensure operational independence of agencies charged with distributing these goods.  The Sphere 
guidelines could also be drawn on in developing these new obligations as could the Right to Food 
Voluntary Guidelines. 
Housing of Food Aid Convention—Where Should It be Based? 
As noted earlier, the FAC is currently housed at the International Grains Council in London.  
While many would argue that there is no longer a compelling reason for it to remain—and decoupling the 
FAC from the International Grains Agreement would strengthen the view that this is no longer 
appropriate—there are a number of issues—both practical and political—associated with moving it 
elsewhere.  Given this, it might be more helpful to consider what functions one would require the body 
housing a renegotiated FAC to undertake.  Three that would seem to have merit are (1) can this body 
provide the requisite secretariat services; (2) can it provide appropriate technical functions, or ensure that 
these are competently undertaken; (3) can it play, and be perceived to play, the role of a neutral party?  
The IGC secretariat has expertise on global grain markets, whereas the FAO has much broader 
expertise related to food aid and food security, as well as international agricultural trade.  As a specialized 
agency of the United Nations, it has a stronger profile within the international system than the Food Aid 
Committee.  FAO already provides secretariats for a wide range of food security-related international 
institutions.  However, whether this makes sense would depend partly on the fate of the CSSD, partly on 
the outcome of debates regarding membership (for example, could the FAC be housed at FAO when its 
membership is restricted), and the political acceptability to FAO’s member states of providing the 22 
Organization with a new or expanded function.  Housing the FAC at WFP would also lead to affirmative 
responses on the first two questions above.  However, as an operational food aid agency, it is questionable 
whether WFP would be regarded as a neutral space for such a body. 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
The British novelist Douglas Adams (1987) once created a character, a detective named Dirk 
Gently, whose guiding principle when confronted with a problem was to understand “the fundamental 
interconnectedness of all things.”  Arguably, such a principle is helpful when confronted with the 
challenges associated with developing coherent views on a new Food Aid Convention.  In doing so, it is 
important to be mindful of its current form and function, and past criticisms of these (section 2), its place 
within the global architecture surrounding the governance of food aid flows—with Doha Round WTO 
negotiations potentially being of critical importance (section 3)—as well the current food security outlook 
(section 4).  
These inform our discussion, in section 5, of major issues that could be considered in developing 
positions on what a new FAC should look like.  Rather than summarize these, we note that debating the 
desirability and nature of commitments, representation, and housing will inform broader debates 
surrounding the objectives of a revised FAC.  Should it have an “instrument focus”—food aid—or a 
problem focus such as “food security” or “hunger”?  Should a problem focus be restricted to emergencies 
only or pertain to broader food security issues?  Should the FAC be a low-key forum for exchange of 
information or should it have some meaningful ways of monitoring commitments and encouraging 
compliance by both donors and recipients?  Debates over issues such as these will reflect views on the use 
of food aid itself.  Conversely, debates regarding the purpose of food aid carry consequences for the 
formation of views on how to revise the FAC. 
To give one example, we have argued elsewhere (Hoddinott, Cohen, and Bos 2003) that the 
principal objective of food aid should be to respond to (1) emergency needs induced by conflict and (2) 
reduce vulnerability to starvation and hunger brought about by covariant shocks.  The latter objective 
entails providing an insurance function for those events for which existing insurance mechanisms and 
markets (especially food markets) work poorly.  “Food aid as insurance” integrates the principle of “do no 
harm;” the importance of measures that reduce risks and hence vulnerability; and the mitigation of 
shocks, both in the short and long term.  It is also consistent with rights-based approaches to food aid 
(Haddad and Oshaug 1998; Eide 2000).  A FAC consistent with such an objective would have a problem 
focus; be (largely) restricted to emergencies; embody explicit commitments (with flexibility permitted in 23 
how these are acted on) backed up by meaningful monitoring and evaluation and include both donors and 
recipients. 
Other reform proposals, such as greater use of cash to procure food locally, or a broader 
humanitarian convention that focuses only on emergencies but not just on food, should likewise be 
evaluated in terms of their implications for the FAC.  In this way, a new FAC will be more likely to 
encompass broad understandings of how to make food aid an effective humanitarian and development 
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